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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By HOMER H. CLARK, JR.*
The 1962 judicial decisions on domestic relations in Colorado
announced no radical departures from prior law. Similarly, the 1962
session of the general assembly produced no legislation of note in
the field of domestic relations. A few of the court cases dealt with
interesting or unusual factual situations which have been noted in
this one year review.
DIVORCE, ALIMONY AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
Two cases concern the merits of divorce actions. The first,
Heckel v. Heckel,1 merely affirmed the trial court's findings on dis-
puted issues of fact as they related to cruelty. The second case,
Harvey v. Harvey,2 likewise affirmed the finding of cruelty, leaving
to the trial court the question whether there were mitigating cir-
cumstances. The case also held that the wife was not barred by res
judicata when she brought a second action for divorce, having lost
her first action, so long as she relied in the second action on acts
of cruelty which had occurred after the first action was dismissed.
This application of res judicata to divorce actions is well estab-
lished.
3
In Simpson v. Simpson,4 the supreme court laid down some use-
ful principles for the application of preliminary restraining orders
in divorce actions. The trial court had restrained certain third party
defendants from turning over property or funds to the husband and,
in addition, had ordered one of the third party defendants to pay
into the registry of the court the amount of $25,000, apparently as
a kind of security against alimony which might be awarded in the
future. The supreme court reversed this action, stating that although
under Rules 111 and 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure restraining
orders may be entered in divorce actions without notice to the de-
fendant and without the requirement of a bond, this should be done
only under extraordinary circumstances or where an actual emer-
gency exists. The court went on to find that no such extraordinary
circumstances or emergency had been shown in this case and that,
therefore, the restraining order was improperly entered. In addi-
tion, the court expressly disapproved the practice of bringing in
banks and business associates of the husband as parties to divorce
actions.
Two cases this year concern the award of attorney's fees in
divorce actions. The first of these, Morrison v. Peck,5 held that an
attorney for the wife may file a motion in the divorce action for
the award of attorney's fees against either the wife or the husband,
relying on the general language of the alimony statute. This seems
to be a rather doubtful procedure 6 since the attorney for the wife is
not a party to the divorce action and normally courts do not enter
Professor of Low, University of Colorado School of Low.
1 373 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1962).
2 373 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1962).
3 Geers v. Geers, 95 N.H. 316, 63 A.2d 244 (1949).
4 376 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1962).
5 376 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1962).
6 Cf. Weil v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 2d 373, 217 P.2d 975 (1950).
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judgments in law suits in favor of persons who are not parties. It
puts the attorney in a very peculiar position with respect to a con-
flict of interests. In the divorce action he represents the wife at the
very time he is asserting a claim against her for his fee. In the
Morrison case itself there was no conflict of interest because the
particular attorney seeking a fee had withdrawn from the case at
an earlier stage. Furthermore, the purpose of the statutory authori-
zation of an award of attorney's fees is not for the protection of the
attorney but rather to insure that the wife is provided with legal
services as well as with other necessaries of life. The other case on
attorneys' fees in divorce actions held that they are not debts dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy. 7 This is in line with the decisions in other
states.8
Several cases this year dealt with the question of modification
of alimony and child support payments. Pritchard v. Pritchard9 held
that when the wife moved that the husband be held in contempt
for non-payment of child support, the trial court, without formal
action by the husband and over the wife's objection, committed
reversible error in reducing the amount due. The supreme court said
such action requires a motion by the husband and proof by him
that the relevant circumstances have changed. Haase v. Haase1"
held that where there are successive petitions for modification of
alimony, the later petition must be based on changes in circum-
stance which have occurred after the denial of the first petition.
This is of course correct since the other rule would allow a re-
peated relitigation of matters already determined by the earlier
petition for modification.
The question of modification of a divorce decree so as to include
an alimony award after the decree had been entered and had be-
come final was dealt with again in Burson v. Burson.1 In this case
the wife sued for divorce and custody of the children, her complaint
containing no prayer for alimony. Nine months after the divorce
decree had been entered she filed a motion in the action asking for
alimony. The court dismissed the motion, giving two reasons for
this disposition. The first reason was that the statute governing the
award of alimony contains "no machinery for putting in motion that
which the statute purports to empower the trial court to do .... -12
It is not at all clear what is meant by this language. The statute
seems to be as clear as a statute can be since it provides that "At
all times after the filing of a complaint, whether before or after the
issuance of a divorce decree, the court may make such orders, if
any, as the circumstances of the case may warrant for: . . . ali-
mony. ' 13 The obvious purpose of this statute is to make it possible
for alimony to be included in divorce decrees at any time, whether
before or after the decree is entered, without any reservation of jur-
isdiction. The supreme court may disapprove of the policy of such a
statute but this would not seem to justify reading it out of the sta-
tute books. The second reason for refusal of alimony in the Burson
7 Allison v. Allison, 372 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1962).
8 E.g., In re Brennen, 39 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
9 367 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1962).
10 376 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1962).
11 369 P.2d 979 (Colo. 1962).
12 Id. at 980.
13 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-5(1)(d) (Supp. 1960).
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case was that the wife had not asked for alimony in her complaint
and under Rule 54(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure a default
judgment cannot be entered different in kind or amount from that
demanded in the complaint. This rule is properly applied to divorce
actions, since a husband may be willing to have the suit go against
him by default where he sees no claim for alimony in the complaint,
whereas he might wish to defend on the merits if alimony were
claimed. This reason does not apply in the Burson case, however,
since it would have been quite easy to give the husband notice of
the claim for alimony when the motion was made and allow him at
that time to come in and present whatever defenses to the alimony
claim he might have available. In that way the objection based on
Rule 54(c) could be overcome.
Two cases during 1962 concerned the extent and modification
of payments due under separation agreements. In re Kettering's
Estate14 held that the payments did not survive the death of the
husband even though the agreement, which was incorporated in the
divorce decree, provided that the payments would continue "so long
as the wife may live and remain unmarried."'" The court construed
the agreement as a whole and found that other provisions including
one by which the husband agreed to leave the sum of $10,000 by
will either to a trust set up to guarantee the payments, or directly
to the wife, indicated that this was to be the exclusive provision for
the wife after the husbands death and negated the inference created
by other parts of the agreement that the payments would continue
beyond his death. This would seem to be a satisfactory reading of
the agreement, although arguments could be made the other way
and were made by the dissenting opinion in this case. The case
should serve as a warning to the attorneys drafting such agreements
to provide specifically in the agreement either for continuance or
for termination of the payments upon the husband's death.
The second case referred to is Irwin v. Irwin.'6 In this case the
divorce was granted to the husband, the decree including provisions
for a division of certain real and personal property and an order for
alimony and child support. A little more than a year after the de-
cree the parties entered into an agreement changing the disposition
of the property and increasing the payments of alimony. By this
14 376 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1962).
15 Id. at 985.
16 372 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1962).
attorneys who want service
consistently select
for publication of legal notices
" Published DAILY ° Proofs shown.
" Copy pickup, of course Affidavits automatically
" Court minutes checked DAILY Legal Editor and Proofreaders
1217 Welton St. TAbor 5-3371
1963
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
agreement the payments of child support were continued in accord-
ance with the earlier decree. The agreement was approved by a
judge of the district court. About two years after the agreement
the husband filed a motion to terminate alimony, to reduce the
amount of the support money payable to the children and also to
reduce certain payments on the real estate of the parties and on
insurance policies. The husband alleged at this time a change in the
circumstances of the parties. After a hearing the trial court relieved
the husband of support payments for one of the children, changed
the provision with respect to alimony and gave to the husband cer-
tain policies of insurance which under the agreement were to be
maintained for the benefit of the wife and children. On appeal the
supreme court held that the trial court had erred in entering such
an order, apparently on the ground that the rights of the parties
had been established by the 1959 contract and that the constitutional
prohibition upon impairment of the obligations of contracts pre-
vented any subsequent modifiation. No cases or other authorities
are cited in the opinion and it is therefore difficult to be certain
just what the basis for this result was. A proper analysis of this
case would turn on whether the agreement of the parties became
a part of the divorce decree. If it did, then it would seem modifiable
upon a showing of changed circumstances just as any other divorce
decree is, whether based on agreement originally or not. The au-
thorities in Colorado make this principle clear enough at least with
respect to alimony and child support.17 Those parts of the decree
or the agreement which relate to property are normally not modi-
fiable.' 8 The opinion of the supreme court indicates that the agree-
ment of the parties was approved by the court and under the sta-
tute now in force this may be sufficient to make it part of the de-
cree, since the statute says that a written agreement or stipulation
of the parties "when incorporated in an order or decree or when
filed in the action and referred to and approved and adopted in any
order or decree, shall become a part of such order or decree."19 If
the agreement was not part of the decree because not incorporated
or adopted in accordance with the statute, the authorities in other
jurisdictions say that this does not prevent the court from modifying
the original decree with respect to its alimony and child support
provisions.20 Such agreements, when made after the entry of ali-
mony and property decrees, are usually held not binding on the
parties or the court unless they are presented to the court and made
a part of the existing decree.
The division of property in divorce actions must be made either
at the time the divorce decree is entered or, if afterwards, only
upon reservation of jurisdiction in the divorce decree. This rule,
found in the statutes ,21 is reiterated this year by Triebelhorn v. Tur-
zanski..2 2 In two other cases the familiar principle that the property
17 E.g. Harris v. Harris, 113 Colo. 41, 154 P.2d 617 (1944); Hall v. Hall, 105 Colo. 227, 97 P.2d
415 (1939).
18 McDonald v. McDonald, 374 P.2d 690 (Colo. 1962); Zlaten v. Zlaten, 117 Colo. 296, 186 P.2d
583 (1947).
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-5(6) (Supp. 1960).
20 Hoops v. Hoops, 292 N.Y. 428, 55 N.E.2d 488 (1944). Other cases are collected in Annot., 166
A.L.R. 370 (1947), and in Desvernine, Ground for Modification of Alimony Awards, 6 Low & Con-
temp. Prob. 236, 247 (1939).
21 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-5(2) (Supp. 19601.
22 370 P.2d 757 (Colo. 1962).
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division is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court,
not to be reversed except upon proof of abuse of this discretion, was
restated.2 3 A third case, Bell v. Bell,'2 4 although adhering to this rule,
found that there was an abuse of discretion in an order which re-
quired the husband to pay off large incumbrances on certain prop-
erty and deliver the property to the wife, without any findings as
to the value of the property of the parties and without other find-
ings which would support such a requirement. Finally, the case of
McDonald v. McDonald2 5 held that property divisions in divorce
decrees are final and not open to modification, a familiar principle
adhered to in jurisdictions other than Colorado .2
6
A waiver of widow's allowance in an ante-nuptial agreement
was upheld as effective in Maher v. Knaussf2 illustrating the type
of specific language in the agreement which is essential to get this
result.
PARENT AND CHILD
Four cases in 1962 concerned problems of custody of children
arising out of divorce actions. Only one of these cases involved an
original grant of custody and this case merely held that since the
trial court had failed to make findings on the character and fitness
of the parties as custodians the award of custody of a small child
to the husband would be reversed. 28 The second case, Grosso v.
Grosso,29 modified an existing custody decree in such a way as to
cancel the visitation rights of the husband on the ground that the
parties had been using the child to hurt each other and that this
was jeopardizing the child's welfare. The third case, Holland v. Hol-
land,30 upheld the trial court's finding that the child's best interests
did not justify authorizing the mother to take the child to Spain.
This decision was in part apparently based on the ground that the
mother had taken the child to Spain after the trial court's decision
was rendered but before the appeal was decided. The supreme court
said that although a change of custody should not be granted as a
means of punishing one of the parties for violating the custody
order, disregard of an order is a factor which the court may weigh
23 Harvey v. Harvey, 373 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1962); Cohan v. Cohan, 372 P.2d 149 (Colo. 1962).
24 371 P.2d 773 (Colo. 1962).
25 374 P.2d 690 (Colo. 1962).
26 Many cases are collected in Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 270, 302 (1956).
27 370 P.2d 1017 (Colo. 1962).
28 Songster v. Songster, 374 P.2d 197 (Colo. 1962).
29 368 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1962).
30 373 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1962).
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in awarding custody. The trial court's decision that custody should
shift to the husband under these circumstances was therefore ap-
proved.
The most interesting of the custody cases is Root v. Allen."
In this case the parents of the child had been divorced and had both
remarried. Sometime after her second marriage the child's mother,
who had custody of the child, died. The father then filed a petition
for habeas corpus seeking to obtain custody of the child from the
stepfather. After a thorough consideration of the requirements of
the child's welfare and best interests the supreme court refused
habeas corpus, holding that the child should remain in the custody
of the stepfather. A major factor in this decision was the long period
during which the child had been in the household of the stepfather
and the warm and stable relationships she had formed there. The
case is particularly interesting in illustrating that the claims of a
natural parent will not always be superior to those of one not re-
lated to the child by blood.
An interesting case on adoption, Batton v. Massar,32 calls atten-
tion to a conflict between the adoption and the relinquishment sta-
tutes. In this case the mother of the child consented to its adoption
by its paternal grandparents. No relinquishment proceeding was
had. Shortly after the adoption decree became final the child's
mother filed a motion to vacate the decree on the ground that it
was entered without jurisdiction, not being in exact compliance
with that section of the statutes requiring a relinquishment pro-
ceeding when the natural parent of the child to be adopted is a
minor, 33 as was the case here. The supreme court held that the
adoption decree should not be vacated, stating that the only part of
the statute to be given meaning is that part which reads "The min-
ority of a natural parent shall not be a bar to such parents' consent
to adoption .... "3 The further language of that section, which reads,
"provided, a court of competent jurisdiction has decreed the relin-
quishment of said child and affirmed subsequent adoption, ' 35 was
held by the supreme court to be meaningless and surplus. The writ-
er has commented at length on this case in another place, there
arguing that a prior relinquishment proceeding is required by the
31 377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962).
32 369 P.2d 434 (Colo. 1962).








statutes where the consent to adoption is that of a person under the
age of twenty-one. 6
The familiar rule that a child born to a married woman in wed-
lock is presumed legitimate was re-emphasized in Lanford v. Lan-
ford.37 The court in that case stated that this is one of the strongest
presumptions known to the law and that it may be overcome only
by proof of impotence or non-access by the husband at the time
when the child could have been conceived. The court went on to
say that the normal period of gestation is from 266 to 270 days, but
that the cases had recognized that much shorter periods are possible.
The trial court's charge to the jury was held erroneous in this case
on the ground that the jury should have been required to determine
whether the husband had access to his wife at any time during the
period of possible conception of his child. The court also held that
it was error to require the wife to testify on cross-examination as
to intercourse with a man other than her husband in the absence
of evidence by the husband overcoming the presumption of legiti-
macy.
Two further cases dealt with relatively minor points in juvenile
court proceedings. Martinez v. People"' held that a citation issued
to parents of a child charged with juvenile delinquency was invalid
under the applicable statute 39 when it contained no notice of the
date and time of hearing and no endorsement of service on the re-
turn. In addition this case held that a decree in a delinquency pro-
ceeding ordering the imprisonment of a juvenile in the county jail
is not authorized by the delinquency statute.4 0 In the other case,
Robles v. People,41 it was held that a motion to vacate the decree
finding the defendant the father of a child and ordering him to
support the child was not a final judgment and therefore could not
be reviewed by the supreme court on a writ of error.
36 Clark, Batton v. Massor: The Finality of Colorado Adoptions, 35 Colo. Rev. No. 3 (1963).
37 377 P.2d 115 (Colo. 1962).
3S 372 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1962).
39 Colo. Rev. Stat. 22-8-3 (Supp. 1960).
40 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-8-11 (Supp. 1960).
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